

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

INDC/PV.87
5 December 1962
ENGLISH

APR 16 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Wednesday, 5 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

(Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. V. ISMIRLIEV

Burma:

U TUN SHEIN

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. A.E. GUTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

ATC HADDIS ALAMAYERU

ATO H. HAMID

ATO M. GHEBEYERU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. F. LUCICLI OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG

Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. CBI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (continued)

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK
Mr. A. SKOTARSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECCOVESCU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Baron C.R. von FLATEN
Mr. M. STAHL
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M.A. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEETAM

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I declare open the eighty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker I should like to read the telegram which the co-Chairmen sent last Monday to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the name of the Conference:

"To Secretary-General U Thant

At its eighty-sixth meeting on 3 December 1962 the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament unanimously decided to convey to you its sense of great satisfaction and pleasure at your election as Secretary-General of the United Nations. All members of the Conference also desire to extend to you their sincere good wishes for success in fulfilling the important functions of your high office and their confidence that you will discharge your responsibilities with distinction in the interests of peace and of all nations.

On behalf of the Conference

Arthur H. Dean

Semyon K. Tsarapkin

Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference"

That same evening the Secretary-General sent the following message to the two co-Chairmen:

"I am most grateful to you both and members of Disarmament Conference for your warm message of congratulations

U Thant, Secretary-General"

I should also like to inform you that the press release containing the text of the Secretary-General's inaugural speech of which Mr. Epstein had announced the distribution has been circulated to you this morning.

I now call on the representative of the United Kingdom.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): At our last meeting we listened to an exceptionally discouraging speech from the Soviet representative (ENDC/PV.86, pp 25-35). Since then many of my colleagues will, I expect, have had the time to look at the verbatim record of yesterday's meeting of the nuclear Sub-Committee (ENDC/SC.1/PV.46). If they have, I am afraid that they will be no less discouraged by the further interventions of Mr. Tsarapkin recorded therein.

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

I have indeed been asked whether I think that it should be assumed that the Soviet representative, by his interventions during the past two days, has dealt a mortal blow to the hope of an agreed test ban in any of the three forms which ought to be possible by 1 January 1963 -- in other words, a comprehensive treaty, as urged by resolutions 1762 A and B (XVII) of the General Assembly or, failing that, a permanent agreement on the three fallout environments, with an interim agreement on the underground environment as recommended in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), or, failing either of these, an agreement on the fallout environments without conditions.

In the face of the statements made by Mr. Tsarapkin it is very difficult to be optimistic. But the strength of the world-wide desire for a nuclear test ban before the New Year is such, and so much of that desire is reflected in the interventions and initiatives of members of this Committee, that I for one, and my delegation, refuse to despair.

The purpose of my intervention today, therefore, is to see whether we cannot gather anything from the many valuable suggestions that have been made in the last few days to lead us forward to at least some temporary agreement which might, in turn, lead to a permanent treaty.

I would put it to the Soviet Union that there is, in fact, much common ground between us in the suggestions and proposals now before the Committee, not only in the more recent suggestions, but also in the Western draft treaties ENDC/58 and ENDC/59, and, of course, in the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28). After all, if we are to build, we can only build on a foundation of common ground. It is useless to single out and to emphasize points of difference. That will get us nowhere. It is also, I submit, useless to insist on agreement to a proposal without saying what that proposal is. It is no good for a farmer to expect another farmer to buy a pig without seeing it. English farmers, who are just like other farmers all over the world, have an expression for this. They say: "To buy a pig in a poke." That is to say, to buy a pig in a sack without being allowed to see what they are being asked to buy. It is one thing to say: "Let us look at the animal together and then we will decide whether to buy it." It is quite another to insist first on agreement to buy, and only then to look at the purchase.

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

Let me turn now to the positive suggestions before us. First let me say that I have particularly noticed the remark by the representative of India at our meeting on 3 December. Mr. Lall then said:

"... the statement we made" -- at the previous meeting -- "was one which could be applied equally to a permanent test ban or to one for a shorter period."

(ENDC/PV.86, p. 51)

I believe that is the case with many of the constructive suggestions which have been made at our recent meetings and I welcome this. I welcome it particularly because, I must repeat, the aim of the United Kingdom is a comprehensive treaty. The principal obstacle is the fact that we do not yet possess -- at least the United Kingdom and the United States do not yet possess -- the scientific knowledge of how to identify all underground events without on-site verification. At the twelve hundred and forty-sixth meeting of the First Committee in New York Mr. Zorin stated not for the first time -- many representatives here, like myself, were present and heard him -- that the Soviet Union possesses this knowledge, and Mr. Tsarapkin has repeated it to us since we returned here. However, Mr. Zorin added that in the present state of international tension the Soviet Union was not willing to communicate it to other governments (A/C.1/PV.1246, pp. 57 and 61).

I must appeal once again to the Soviet Government, through our Soviet colleague at this table, to make this knowledge available to us, if it has it; or, if it does not want to give it to us directly, then to furnish it to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. That would make possible the signature of a comprehensive treaty without provision for on-site verification. That is why -- with our deadline of 1 January in mind -- I repeat this appeal today. If, on the other hand, the truth is that further scientific research is required in this field, then I renew my appeal that the Soviet Government should join with us in conducting this research.

Even if these appeals remain unanswered, the comprehensive treaty could nevertheless still be signed in short order, containing such a modest and limited amount of international verification that the objections could not, in our view, justifiably be considered by any government to outweigh the benefits to the security of all of us which would flow from a permanent ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

Perhaps I may remind the Committee that the proposal for a small annual quota of on-site inspections so long as these are necessary -- which is all the assurance of observance we are asking for -- was put forward officially by Chairman Khrushchev himself. Members of the Committee who wish to refresh their memories might care to look again at Chairman Khrushchev's message to Mr. Macmillan of 23 April 1959, which Mr. Tsarapkin himself read into the record of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests at its eighty-third meeting on 27 April 1959 (AMC/DNA/PV.83, pp.5-7). In that message Chairman Khrushchev formally proposed a small annual quota of on-site inspections to be chosen by the other side. To give expression to this proposal Mr. Tsarapkin, on behalf of the Soviet Government, introduced at the one hundred and eighth meeting of that Conference on 9 July 1959 a draft article expressing in treaty language Chairman Khrushchev's proposal. With the permission of my colleagues I will read the draft article, because I think that sometimes in our discussions we may err on the side of generalities and not always take account of the importance of actual, precise treaty formulation. In this case the treaty formulation was that of the Soviet Government itself. The draft article formulated by the Soviet Government and proposed by Mr. Tsarapkin read as follows. Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"... the Soviet delegation wishes to introduce the following draft article:

'For the purpose of preventing possible violations by States of their obligations under this treaty, there shall, in addition to the network of control posts, be carried out on-site inspection of unidentified events suspected of being nuclear weapon explosions.

'1. In order to carry out on-site inspection of such unidentified events on the basis of criteria set forth in Article _____, ... there may be made in each year on the territory of each of the original parties not more than _____... inspections at any place where, according to readings of instruments at control posts, an unidentified event suspected of being a nuclear weapon explosion has occurred.

'2. Inspections under paragraph 1 of this article shall be carried out -

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- (a) on territories under the jurisdiction or control of the United States or the United Kingdom, at the request of the Soviet Union;
- (b) on the territory of the Soviet Union, at the request of the United States or the United Kingdom.

'Inspection groups within the specified quota shall be despatched by the commission without delay, and agreement between the original parties to the treaty shall not be required.'" (GEN/DNI/FV.108, pp.3 and 4)

The proposals made by Chairman Khrushchev in his letter of 23 April 1959 and the draft treaty article presented by Mr. Tsarapkin continued to be the declared policy of the Soviet Union until 28 November 1961, when it withdrew them. We were and we are negotiating, all of us, as free and independent Governments. We are of course, all of us, free to put forward proposals, and we are free to withdraw them. But what I am saying is that, if the Soviet Government were willing today to take the position that it took for two years until almost exactly a year ago, a comprehensive treaty could no doubt be signed by 1 January 1963. I am saying further that the idea of a small quota of inspections is not some unfriendly suggestion made by the West to the detriment of the Soviet Union but something which Mr. Khrushchev himself proposed as being fair and advantageous to both sides.

However, if the Soviet Government is unwilling today to make a binding and continuing commitment to accept what it was willing to accept a year ago, then I want to assure the Committee that, as a second best and as a step towards a comprehensive agreement, the United Kingdom is willing to sign a permanent agreement without international verification in the three fallout environments and to conclude in the underground environment a temporary agreement as recommended by the General Assembly in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) of 6 November. At our last two meetings emphasis has been laid by a number of delegations -- and in particular by the delegations of Sweden, Canada, India and Mexico -- on the desirability of such an agreement being concluded between the nuclear Powers, as a second best to a comprehensive agreement, by 1 January 1963. On behalf of the United Kingdom I repeat that we agree. The United Kingdom voted for this in the United Nations. We are prepared for it now. In deciding what form such an

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agreement would take, always within the framework of paragraph 6 of Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), the United Kingdom is willing, and more than willing, to take account of the suggestions put forward by, among others, the delegations of Sweden, Canada, India and Mexico. We are willing to pursue this question with the Soviet Union either in private conversations or in the three-Power nuclear test ban Sub-Committee or here in plenary meeting. We are not so much concerned with methods; we want results.

The essential elements of such an interim arrangement are, in the view of the speakers I have named, firstly, the setting up of at least an interim international commission, whether or not that interim commission would take more or less the same shape as a permanent commission, and, secondly, as laid down in General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), that there should be adequate assurances for the effective detection and identification of seismic events by the commission.

As to the form of an international commission, temporary or permanent, we are willing to discuss and to negotiate. In our view the essential point is that such a commission, whether temporary or permanent, should be of such a character as to command the confidence of all countries concerned. Until a year ago the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the United States, on the other hand, were agreed that a commission should consist of four representatives of one nuclear side, four representatives of the other, and three representatives of uncommitted countries. In the new Western draft treaty proposals we suggested four representatives of one nuclear side, four representatives of the other, and seven of uncommitted countries (EMDC/58, Article IV). Others have suggested that the Commission should be composed entirely of neutral scientists.

All this can be discussed, but whatever the composition, either temporary or permanent, two basic propositions should, we submit, be kept in mind. On either basis the commission should be the body which alone decides whether an event qualifies for inspection. But, the commission having so decided, there are two alternatives. The first is that a country would be under obligation to invite inspection of any event which the commission had thus decided should qualify for inspection and which the commission asked should be inspected. But if it is objected that such a system would result in too many inspections -- perhaps forty or fifty a year in a given country -- there is the second alternative of a quota,

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perhaps ten or twelve, or fewer, which would amount to a deterrent inspection of, say, one in four or five events which by decision of the commission qualify for inspection. In this second case, of a quota, the decision by the commission on which of these events qualify for inspection, which of them should actually be inspected, should rest with the other nuclear side. That was the proposal of Chairman Khrushchev to which I have already referred. It was the proposal put to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests by Mr. Tsarapkin in actual treaty terms which I have already read out. It is one of those unfortunately few matters on which both nuclear sides were agreed and had expressed their agreement in writing.

Now let me turn again to our last two meetings. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, we find ourselves in agreement with most of the propositions which the representative of India, Mr. Lall, put forward. Let me refer to the verbatim record of our eighty-fifth meeting, when Mr. Lall asked:

"Could not all the States concerned agree to a certain quota of inspections* per annum?" (ENDC/PV.85, p.42 - Provisional).

I would answer: the United Kingdom agrees.

When Mr. Lall said:

"Of course that quota could only be fixed in the first instance for the first year, because instruments might improve and other factors might arise which would justify a revision of the stated quota of inspections*." (ibid.)

I would reply: the United Kingdom agrees.

When Mr. Lall argued that:

"In fact the agreement of both the commission and the country is, I would suggest, axiomatic whatever form is chosen for the modalities of verification." (ibid.)

I would reply: of course, no country can ever be forced to accept an on-site inspection. That was agreed long ago between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union in the three-Power Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. There must be free consent, but that free consent must be expressed beforehand in a treaty commitment, a commitment freely entered into but none the less a commitment. This we ourselves are willing to do. The commitment

*For "inspection" read "invitation". Final version ENDC/PV.85, p. 24.

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might be qualified in certain respects. It might be qualified, for example, as regards numbers, that is to say, by quota. It might even be qualified as regards the areas for which invitations would be issued -- to the extent, for example, of saying something like this: 85 per cent of the Soviet Union is not an earthquake area; there might be a very small number indeed of inspections a year in this vast area, and indeed, unless there were man-made explosions, the probability is that in this huge non-earthquake area there would be nothing for the instruments to record. I myself cannot really see what unidentified event there could ever be in a non-earthquake area, an area in which no earthquakes occur, and in which there is no man-made nuclear test explosion. But in the fifteen per cent of the Soviet Union where there are earthquake areas -- which is not in the heartland of the Soviet Union but chiefly in the Kamchatka Peninsula, in the Kuriles and in the Pamir region -- there might be need for a few more inspections, although perhaps the number of these could be reduced by the use of "black boxes" in these areas.

However that may be, one of the essential points is, as Mr. Lall went on to say, that if any country or countries are guilty of breaches of the agreement, such breaches would free the other members from being tied any longer to the agreement. And Mr. Lall added:

"... non-co-operation in supplying the commission with the evidence and in making available facilities of all kinds, would be a breach of the agreement and would" -- or could -- "result in the agreement's ceasing, because, after all, the eight-nation memorandum puts an obligation upon all countries to supply all that is required in order to establish the nature of an event. Therefore under the normal rules governing equity and responsibility a country which was in breach in this respect would in fact have broken the agreement, which would no longer subsist." (ENDC/PV.85, p.25)

I agree with Mr. Lall.

The United Kingdom is also in general agreement with the propositions which Mr. Lall put forward and which will be found on pages 25 and 26 of the verbatim record of our eighty-fifth meeting. I have further noted that the statements put forward by the representative of India were in the nature of explanations of the intention and meaning of the eight-Power memorandum, as I understood him, and this memorandum has of course been accepted by the United Kingdom as a basis for negotiation.

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But these and other propositions put forward by Mr. Lall were not the only constructive and helpful suggestions which emerged at our last two meetings. I am happy to say that the United Kingdom is in general agreement with the remarks of the representative of Mexico (ENDC/PV.85, pp. 33-37). These were quoted with approval by the representative of Burma at our meeting on 3 December (ENDC/PV.86, p.14-15). The representative of Burma said that the suggestion that invitations should be extended if the international scientific commission believes that in the case of a doubtful event on-site inspection is necessary is one which, together with the idea of an agreed annual quota of inspections* mentioned by the Indian delegation, in the view of the Burmese delegation merited earnest consideration by the nuclear Powers. The United Kingdom is not only prepared to give earnest consideration to that proposition; it agrees with it.

The principal purpose of my intervention today is to try, on behalf of the United Kingdom, to give further impulsion to these initiatives and suggestions, to the remarks made by the representatives of Sweden, Canada, the United Arab Republic, India, Mexico and Burma. I have made it clear that we, like they, prefer a comprehensive agreement. In so far as this requires a political act by the Soviet Union, I would urge the Soviet Government to take that act. But if it is not yet prepared to do so, if it requires more time, I join my voice to that of the delegations I have named and to the majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations in urging the negotiation of an interim agreement for the underground environment in the terms of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) for whatever period may be agreed upon. That would surely have the advantage for the Soviet Union that if it found the terms of the agreement onerous, as I find it hard to believe, it could call a halt to it or re-negotiate it at the agreed moment. It would not thereby be undertaking permanently any commitment of which it might feel a doubt.

There is a further suggestion before us about the possible use of "black boxes", that is to say, of unmanned seismic stations for the detection of underground events. The question was raised recently in the Sub-Committee by our Soviet colleague himself. It was spoken of at our last plenary meeting (ENDC/PV.86), and my colleagues will no doubt have seen that it was further discussed in the nuclear Sub-Committee yesterday. (ENDC/SC.1/PV.46) In this matter also my delegation is seeking for common ground and

*For "inspection" read "invitation".

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not for points of disagreement. By all means let us discuss the possible use of "black boxes" and see whether it may help to narrow the gap between the two sides and to reduce the requirements both for the use of conventional detection stations and even, perhaps, for the number of on-site inspections. The United Kingdom is ready and indeed anxious to take further part in discussion with the Soviet Union of this proposal. I should like, therefore, formally to propose that a meeting be convened of competent experts from the West, from the Soviet Union and, if desired, from other countries which have such experts, to examine where and how far the use of "black boxes" could be helpful in improving means of detection and identification. If there is a hope of making progress in this way, do not let us throw it away. Even without a meeting of experts, we are prepared to go into this matter with the representative of the Soviet Union as thoroughly as we can do without experts to help us.

Let me sum up in a few words what I have been trying to say. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, we are suggesting at least four alternative forms of agreement.

If the Soviet Union can show us, as it claims to be able to do, how to identify all underground events by national detection systems, we ought to be able to sign a permanent and comprehensive treaty by 1 January 1963. That is our first offer.

If, on the other hand, more research is needed, in fact, into the identification of underground events, then let us sign a comprehensive treaty with the minimum amount of international verification still required, at least for the time being, and let this minimum be on the lines of Mr. Khrushchev's own earlier proposals. That is our second offer.

If the Soviet Union wants more time for negotiation on either of those proposals, then let us carry out the recommendation in operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) and conclude a permanent agreement without international verification in the three fallout environments with an interim agreement on the underground environment. That is our third offer.

In seeking agreement on any of these lines, the United Kingdom proposes that we should follow up actively recent suggestions made by a number of non-nuclear or uncommitted delegations, including Canada, the United Arab Republic, Sweden, India, Mexico and Burma. But if the Soviet Union is not prepared for any of these three solutions, then let us sign a permanent agreement on the fallout environments by 1 January 1963 without international verification and without conditions while we are negotiating further.

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I must again underline the heavy responsibility towards mankind which, in our view, any government must necessarily assume which declines any one of these four alternative ways of meeting the deadline of an agreement by 1 January 1963 which the United Nations General Assembly has laid down. I am still reluctant to believe that the answer "No" to all these proposals and suggestions is the New Year's present which the Soviet Union intends to give to the world.

Ato HADDIS ALAMAYEHU (Ethiopia): On behalf of my delegation and myself I should like to welcome warmly the representatives of Burma and Czechoslovakia who have just joined us in this Committee. I am sure their contribution will be of great value to our endeavour, as were the contributions of their predecessors. I should also like to express the hope that our deliberations and our efforts in this resumed session will achieve better and more fruitful results. We are resuming our negotiations on the same subjects on which we were negotiating before our recess in September last, namely, general and complete disarmament and a nuclear test ban agreement, but we are resuming these negotiations in circumstances and an atmosphere that are somewhat changed.

I do not intend to enumerate all the factors which together must favourably influence our negotiations, as this has already been done by other speakers who have preceded me. I should like, nevertheless, to repeat some of them.

One of the factors is, as many representatives have already mentioned, the recent exchange of messages between the leaders of the three nuclear Powers, in which all three of them have affirmed their readiness to seek and to achieve agreement particularly in the field of disarmament. It is true that similar messages, statements and affirmations of readiness to negotiate and to conclude agreements on disarmament and other controversial world problems have been made in the past by one or other of the leaders of the great Powers, but the recent exchange of messages, coming as it did after the dreadful events in the Caribbean, must be understood differently from all the other messages, because those events must have shown to the great Powers the full meaning of their nuclear armaments race.

(Ato Maddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

The second of the factors to which I have referred is that on the subject of the nuclear test ban -- and that is the subject to which I would limit my remarks today -- there have recently been reports that the system of unmanned stations, or the so-called "black boxes", could materially reduce uncertainty in the detection and identification of seismic events. I am aware, of course, that certain reservations have been made and that there have been even outright assertions by some authorities that this system would be complicated, that it would be costly, that it would even be unreliable, and so forth. That may be so. It may be that the system might not give a full guarantee, or remove all doubts, as regards clandestine underground testing, but its value as an additional means, if not as an improvement over the existing system of detection and identification of seismic events, seems to have gained recognition.

The third and last factor which I should like to mention as improving the situation is the fact that we now have a clear instruction from the General Assembly of the United Nations on the time limit within which the testing of nuclear weapons should cease, on what arrangement or arrangements should be made to bring about such a cessation of tests within the fixed time limit and on the basis to be used to achieve that end.

With this and other new elements enumerated by other representatives before me as having favourable effects on the general situation, we in the Ethiopian delegation believe that we can achieve the objective which the peoples of the world urgently seek, namely, the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear testing.

Of course the success or failure of our efforts to achieve that objective depends, and depends entirely, upon the will of the nuclear Powers to end this dangerous game. If there is a will on the part of the great nuclear Powers to agree, we believe that all the necessary elements for permanent as well as provisional agreements are provided for in one of the General Assembly resolutions, namely, resolution 1762 A (XVII) (ENDC/63). The question therefore is, are the great nuclear Powers willing to reach such an agreement? Are they willing to respond to the earnest and anxious appeal of humanity, or are they going to continue to disregard such appeal? That is the question. But the great nuclear Powers

(Ato Haddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

must be reminded, and reminded constantly, of their grave responsibility to the peoples of the world. Under Article 106 of the Charter of the United Nations the great Powers are specifically entrusted with the maintenance of the peace and security of the world, and it is the peace and security of the world, of which they are the trustees, that are now being endangered as a result of their own nuclear armaments race. We would therefore ask the great Powers to honour their pledge, which they freely and voluntarily gave, and to agree to halt their nuclear testing, which has become a menace to the security of the peoples of the world, including their own.

I said a moment ago that the necessary elements for reaching an agreement to end all tests were provided for in resolution 1762 (XVII) of the General Assembly if only the great Powers were willing to agree. In that resolution the General Assembly, after condemning all tests and asking the parties to end tests by 1 January 1963, recommended in paragraph 6 that if the parties had not reached an agreement on the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim agreement suspending all underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum, such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events.

As we in the Ethiopian delegation see it, three major points seem to emerge from resolution 1762 A (XVII): first, that all tests should in any event cease by 1 January 1963; secondly, that in order to achieve that end the parties should negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession; and thirdly, that if the parties do not reach a comprehensive agreement banning all tests by 1 January 1963, as a result of their differences in regard to underground tests, an interim arrangement should be made suspending all such underground tests. Of these three points, the first -- namely, the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963 -- seems to be the main objective. The other two -- namely, negotiations for a comprehensive test ban agreement and an agreement on the three non-controversial environments accompanied by an interim arrangement in regard to underground tests -- seem to be the means of arriving at the achievement of that main objective.

(Ato Haddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

I should add in this connexion that our understanding of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) is that if an agreement banning tests in the three non-controversial environments accompanied by an interim arrangement to suspend underground tests, were to be reached, negotiations on the comprehensive and permanent treaty ending tests in all environments and for ever would be continued urgently and relentlessly until such a treaty were concluded.

If this is the case, as we think it is, the question arises: is it possible to negotiate and reach agreement on a treaty banning tests in all environments and for ever between now and 1 January 1963? If the nuclear Powers think that there is such a possibility, no one would be happier than the delegation of Ethiopia to continue discussion on such a comprehensive and permanent agreement. If, on the other hand, the nuclear Powers think that such a comprehensive and permanent agreement banning all tests for ever would prove difficult to attain between now and 1 January 1963, then it would appear to us to be advisable for the Committee to revert to the alternative means provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) -- namely, an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the three environments with an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests -- in order to arrive at the objective set forth in this document by the General Assembly, namely, the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963.

In the event that the Committee and the nuclear Powers desired to concentrate the discussion on the interim arrangements provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) between now and the end of the year, our view is that such an interim arrangement could be achieved on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28). In fact, according to resolution 1762 A (XVII) the eight-nation memorandum would serve as a basis for the conclusion of a permanent treaty as well as for an interim arrangement.

The resolution states in relation to the proposed interim agreement that there should be adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission. Therefore, there must be a system providing adequate assurances against violation of the agreement, however interim or provisional such an agreement might be. But such a system might not be

(Ato Taddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

identical to a system providing for a permanent agreement; otherwise, there would be no need to enter into an interim agreement. The only reason for entering into an interim agreement whilst continuing negotiations on a permanent treaty would appear to be to find -- through such continued negotiations and in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession -- a better and more reassuring system than the provisional agreement. With this in mind, my delegation supports the proposal of the representative of Sweden made on 28 November when he said:

"We consider that the time has now come directly to request the nuclear Powers immediately and without awaiting the elaboration of a comprehensive agreement to call in a panel of scientists from different countries, especially seismologists, leaving it to this panel to act for the time being as an interim commission." (ENDC/PV.84, pp. 17 and 18)

and when he said further, in the same document:

"In order that the panel should be able to act as an interim commission, it should implicitly be entrusted with certain basic functions which the eight-Power memorandum has envisaged for the permanent commission and on which there is agreement between both sides." (ibid., p.19)

I should like to say here that the functions of the commission in the eight-nation memorandum, which the representative of Sweden proposes for the interim commission and which my delegation supports today, have been the subject of extensive discussion during recent sessions of this Committee and, as all members will recall, each and every one of the representatives of the eight non-aligned countries has stated on many occasions that the question of interpreting those functions and the application of all the provisions in the memorandum to the permanent treaty should be left for negotiation between the parties with a view to arriving at agreed and mutually acceptable terms. My delegation still holds this view.

With regard to the question of providing adequate assurance against violation of the proposed interim agreement, we believe that the interim commission, with the functions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the eight-nation memorandum as they are, would meet the requirement of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII). Even if there are certain sections in the memorandum requiring

(Ato Maddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

agreed interpretation through negotiation, there are other sections clearly defining the task of the proposed commission and the rights and obligations of the parties which require no interpretation -- for example, the processing by the commission of all data received from the agreed system of observation posts and its reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of a thorough and objective examination of all available data; the obligation of the parties to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious event; the obligation of the parties to consult with the commission with a view to clarifying and facilitating the assessment of certain doubtful evidence; the reporting by the commission to the parties concerned of all the data and of all the circumstances, including its assessments and, lastly, the right of the parties to be free to determine their actions with regard to the treaty. All these seem to be among the clear functions requiring no interpretation.

The Swedish proposal, therefore, to establish an interim commission with functions such as are envisaged in the eight-nation memorandum seems, in the view of the Ethiopian delegation, a sound proposal and one which should be acceptable to the nuclear Powers. This agreement, although provisional and applicable only until replaced by a permanent one, will, I believe, have to be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with article 102 of the Charter so that it will have the force of any other international treaty and so that its violators will be considered as breaking their contractual obligation. It would not be right, therefore, to say that such an agreement would be an uncontrolled voluntary moratorium.

Finally, my delegation will continue to study very carefully the very interesting and useful suggestions made by the representatives of India (ENDC/PV.35, pp.18 et s.) and Mexico (ibid. pp.33 et s.).

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The United Nations General Assembly, alarmed by the continued nuclear weapon tests and aware that world public opinion unanimously demands the cessation of all nuclear tests, has launched an earnest appeal to the nuclear Powers to take the necessary steps to stop

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

testing forthwith. At the same time the General Assembly, in its resolution 1762 A (XVII), has asked that testing should cease by 1 January 1963 at the latest. It is time to recall this urgent request by the General Assembly since it lays heavy responsibilities on the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

With a view to continuing our work, we should take our bearings and see where we stand, as Mr. Dean said in his speech of 26 November. That is what the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria would like to do before going on to deal with certain points which have been raised recently.

In its desire to achieve a cessation of all nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to consider favourably the appeals made to the nuclear Powers. Its representatives have repeatedly stated that it was ready to discontinue all nuclear tests at once if the Western Powers did likewise, and that it agreed to fix 1 January 1963 as the date after which there should be no more nuclear explosions.

At the same time the Soviet Union said that it was ready to negotiate and sign such agreement as might be necessary for this purpose. The Western Powers on their side, after a long insistence on international control for the discontinuance of all nuclear tests - I repeat "all nuclear tests" - submitted on 27 August 1962 two draft treaties (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59). The first, (ENDC/58) covering all nuclear tests including those underground, is subject to the condition of compulsory on-site inspections, and this in the present stage of scientific development justifies the belief that this condition is attached solely in order to prevent the conclusion of an agreement.

In his statement on 3 December, the United States representative, Mr. Dean, alleged that this first draft treaty would "include many of the suggestions made by the eight members of the Committee in their joint memorandum". He said:

"The treaty itself, as will be observed from study of it, reflects the primacy of the three important elements of the eight-nation memorandum - an international scientific commission, a detection system of observation posts throughout the world, and a number of necessary obligatory on-site inspections by the commission of otherwise unidentified events." (ENDC/FV.86, p. 16)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Those statements are quite arbitrary and do not correspond to the fact. It is enough to refer to the text of the United States and United Kingdom draft to understand what they mean by "international scientific commission". Moreover, Mr. Dean once again developed this point in his speech the day before yesterday when he spoke of "a large number of representatives from the States not committed" (ENDC/PV.86, p.23), though still maintaining the idea that this commission should include representatives of the nuclear Powers. Such an interpretation has nothing to do with the suggestion contained in the memorandum which has since been generally adopted, namely that this commission might be composed of scientists from the non-aligned countries. The memorandum further suggests that no representatives of the nuclear Powers should be included on it.

Secondly, Mr. Dean referred in his statement to the provision of the draft treaty concerning detection stations. He spoke of manned detection stations throughout the world, including those "on the territory of the Soviet Union" (ibid. p.17) etc. This provision of the Western draft treaty represents a tendency to go beyond the existing national systems and thus beyond the eight-nation memorandum.

The third main element which the United States and the United Kingdom claim to have adopted from the eight-nation memorandum is the reference to "a number of necessary and compulsory on-site inspections" (ibid. p.16), to which no reference can be found in the memorandum. It would perhaps be useful to recall some facts and statements by representatives of the Western Powers which show how untrue is the assertion that compulsory inspection as envisaged in the Western treaty has been borrowed from the eight-nation memorandum. It will certainly be remembered that amongst the thirteen questions which the United States delegation thought fit to put to the authors of the memorandum the day after it had been submitted, there was one - question No.10 put by Mr. Dean himself - in which we find the following sentence:

".....would there be some circumstances in which a party would have an obligation under the treaty to permit an on-site inspection or would the offer of an inspection always be a voluntary act?" (ENDC/29, p.2)

That was the question put by the Western delegations and it needs no comment.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The representative of Italy was right when he assured us that the reply from the Western Powers would come very quickly, but its purport was quite different from that which he had led us to expect. It was in fact the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, who gave the answer. During our Committee's first session last spring, we repeatedly recalled a statement by Mr. Macmillan in the House of Commons the day after the memorandum had been submitted to the effect that in his opinion there was no provision for compulsory on-site inspection in the memorandum and that was why it was not acceptable to the Western Powers. That moreover was the reason given by the Western delegations for their refusal to accept the memorandum as a basis for our negotiations. This attitude on their part was clearly reflected in the first report made by our Committee to the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/42). It was also reflected in the two draft treaties which were submitted on 27 August and which, to use Mr. Dean's own words, are only:

"an overall simplification of previous United States and United Kingdom draft treaties, including the draft treaty of 18 April 1961".

In other words, the Western Powers have not budged an inch from their original stand which was based on compulsory on-site inspection - the stumbling block of all our efforts to reach agreement.

It therefore becomes clear that the three elements which according to Mr. Dean were borrowed by the United States and the United Kingdom from the memorandum of the neutral States are not reproduced in the United States and the United Kingdom draft treaty or - which comes to the same thing - the provisions of the draft treaty do not correspond to those of the eight-nation memorandum.

It still seems to us, however, that the best solution is to take the eight-nation memorandum as a basis of agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, especially since in its resolution 1762 A (XVII) the United Nations General Assembly considers this memorandum to represent "a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations" designed to put an end to underground tests (ENDC/63 - A/RES/1762 (XVII), p.2). In paragraph 4 of the operative part of this same resolution, the memorandum is recommended as a basis for negotiations. (ibid.p.3)

(Mr. Tarabancov, Bulgaria)

If the Western nuclear Powers are not ready even now, after the adoption of the United Nations resolution on the suspension of nuclear tests, to take the memorandum as a basis for negotiations and agreement, another solution is offered by the Soviet Union's readiness to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, provided that this agreement at the same time includes an undertaking to refrain from carrying out underground tests while negotiations are in progress and until a final agreement has been reached (ENDC/11, p.5).

This second possibility offered by the Soviet Union aims at eliminating mankind's fears of a continuance of tests and a nuclear arms race, since it precludes any renewal of these tests.

The same does not apply to the Western Powers' proposals, as their second draft treaty (ENDC/59) concerning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water still allows of the continuance of underground nuclear tests and thus gives free rein to the nuclear armaments race.

Certain representatives of the Western Powers insist on the need to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the three environments, with a view to favourably impressing world public opinion and showing that some progress had been made towards the discontinuance of nuclear tests as a result of their goodwill and spirit of compromise.

It is scarcely necessary to point out that the Western representatives who present the question in this way are fully aware of the deep motives of the delegations which desire to put an end once and for all to all nuclear tests in preference to achieving a partial cessation of tests. A partial cessation would answer neither to the needs and requirements of the moment nor to the interests of the peoples.

But since this question recurs once again in our discussions, we should like to recall the reply given to it by some delegations, particularly by the representative of Burma who in his statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 16 October said:

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

"At first sight, a treaty prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and leaving it open to the parties to test underground until agreement is reached on underground tests would seem to have its attractions." (A/C.I/PV.1249, p.7)

and a little later:

"But all this would be true only if such an agreement sticks, and my delegation has grave doubts whether it will in fact do so." (ibid.)

The representative of Burma added later:

"It thus becomes clear that underground tests cannot be considered in isolation. They are closely and intimately related to the tests in other environments. As long as they continue, it will be difficult indeed to stop the others. That is why my delegation feels that a (partial) treaty would have the most precarious, and in all probability, a very short life. What is worse, a partial test ban which came to grief could do more harm than have no partial ban." (ibid.)

When the other day we heard the United Kingdom representative express his annoyance at certain statements which had been made here by the Soviet Union representative, we at once thought of this reply given by the representative of Burma to all the questions of this sort which are continually put by the Western delegations.

These carefully considered comments by the representative of Burma, a country which is deeply concerned to ensure once and for all the cessation of all nuclear tests as well as to put an end to the nuclear armaments race, show clearly why it is dangerous to have recourse to a partial solution of the problem.

That the aims pursued by the representatives of the Western Powers in submitting a partial treaty for the cessation of nuclear tests are far from being purely humanitarian is clear from the fact that they are using underground tests to continue the armaments race. Moreover, the United Kingdom representative, speaking at a meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on 20 November, admitted that after the cessation of tests in the three environments, the underground tests would continue. He said:

"Of course other underground tests may continue on both sides. We do not know the extent to which they will go". (ENDC/SC.1/PV.44, p.14)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

We, too, do not know how far these tests will go, but there can be no doubt that in view of the preparations made in the United States they will be continued on a large scale in that country with the result that the armaments race will be accelerated.

Those who insist on the merits of a partial treaty are in favour of the continuance of the nuclear armaments race. As already pointed out here, the Western Powers would in this way give other States which are not yet nuclear Powers an excuse and an opportunity to join in the nuclear armaments race. The continuance of underground tests is likely at the same time to hinder negotiations on the conclusion of a final treaty for the cessation of nuclear tests. By accelerating the spiral of nuclear re-armament, such a solution might even render impossible the accomplishment of the task entrusted to our Committee.

Nearly all the delegations, and particularly those of the non-aligned countries, have insisted on the fact that favourable conditions now exist for reaching agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests. These conditions and these possibilities have been commented on at length in some statements made since the resumption of our Conference's work. We do not intend - and we do not need - to describe these favourable conditions. What is needed is to take advantage of them in order to carry out one of the tasks assigned to our Committee, namely, the discontinuance of nuclear tests in all environments. This task has indeed been greatly facilitated by the latest proposals from the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests in the three environments, subject to an undertaking not to carry out underground tests until a final agreement has been reached, and without any compulsory on-site inspection.

This last proviso is justified by the conclusions of various scientific authorities about the new methods of detection and identification of underground tests. We do not propose to dwell on the technical considerations which have been raised in this connexion, particularly as regards the possibilities offered by the installation of automatic recording stations referred to recently, nor on the various other methods of identification which might be used. All these questions have been discussed at length and in detail by delegations which have studied them thoroughly.

(Mr. Parabanov, Bulgaria)

Such an interim solution could offer excellent prospects of satisfying the demands of an anxious world and meeting the wishes expressed during the General Assembly debates, by permitting the nuclear Powers to continue their negotiations with a view to reaching a final solution of the problem in the near future.

I should like to point out incidentally that these possibilities to which reference has been made at international scientific conferences have at once been seized upon by the Western Powers in order to try to involve the Conference in technical discussions. Thus, in his statement today, the United Kingdom representative proposed the undertaking of technical studies (supra, p. 13) - in which our Conference would soon find itself bogged down. Such proposals are undoubtedly made in order to prevent the early conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

The Western Powers are violently opposed to any solution providing for the cessation of underground nuclear tests until a final treaty has been concluded, if provision is not at the same time made for compulsory on-site inspection. Their formula of refusal is ready. They repeat endlessly: "We are not prepared to accept an uncontrolled and uninspected moratorium". In fact some representatives are so accustomed to using this formula that one has the impression that if they were woken up suddenly, these hallowed words would spring to their lips.

What are the reasons given by the Western Delegations for refusing to stop their underground nuclear tests until a final treaty has been concluded? There are none. Yet it should be pointed out that throughout the duration of the voluntary nuclear test ban, the Western Powers never alleged that the Soviet Union had carried out clandestine tests. Moreover, when the Soviet Union deemed it necessary to carry out nuclear tests in the interests of its own security, it declared its intentions openly before the whole world.

The intransigence of the Western Powers in strenuously insisting on the alleged need for compulsory on-site inspection has created an atmosphere of anxiety and apprehension. The world fears that it will once again prove impossible to obtain concrete and positive results on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. That impression was strengthened by today's speech by the United Kingdom representative in which he insisted on going back to his old stand on compulsory inspection.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

That is perhaps the reason for the somewhat hasty solutions put forward in the last few days referring to a limited and agreed period. In our view such solutions would not be likely to solve the problems which confront us, and might create new difficulties in the future. It would be neither useful nor is it necessary to improvise hasty procedures in regard to underground tests which might lead us away from the basic principles of the eight-nation memorandum. Moreover, some of these suggestions are contrary to the spirit and even the letter of the General Assembly resolution on which they appear to be based.

To show to what extent these suggestions run counter to the spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), and particularly of paragraph 6 of that resolution, it may be useful to recall certain points connected with its drafting. When the question was first discussed in the First Committee, the Canadian delegation submitted several amendments to the original draft of the non-aligned countries, one of which, after further modifications, became paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A.

The second Canadian version of this paragraph (document A/C.1/L.313/Rev.1) referred to an agreement prohibiting tests in the three environments - in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space - "accompanied by an interim arrangement limited in time suspending all underground tests". The Canadian delegation was obliged to abandon the expression "limited in time" because it was the clearly expressed wish of the great majority of the delegations that this "interim arrangement" should remain in force throughout subsequent negotiations on underground tests until a final agreement had been concluded on all tests.

When the United States and the United Kingdom submitted their draft amendment to the Canadian amendment (document A/C.1/L.316) they suggested the following new sentence:

"Such limited interim agreement shall include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission." (A/C.1/L.316)

(Mr. Tarabancov, Bulgaria)

It should be noted that the final text of resolution 1762 A embodies no less than three important modifications of this sentence, and the representatives of India and the Soviet Union have already referred to this briefly.

In the first place the words "interim arrangement limited in time" (A/C.1/L.313/Rev.1) were replaced by the words "such interim agreement". Not only were the words "limited in time" omitted but the words "interim arrangement (arrangement provisoire)" were replaced by the words "interim agreement (accord intérimaire)" in the last sentence of paragraph 6. The word "interim (intérimaire)" is better than the word "provisoire" because it implies that the "arrangement" will last for such time as the situation has not been regularized, or until the conclusion of a final agreement also covering underground tests.

The representative of India said the other day:

"It is true and it is only fair to say that these words "for a limited period" were deleted in the course of the negotiation, and our understanding of the words "accompanied by an interim arrangement" was that this arrangement would be a provisional one until a final arrangement could be found, but not necessarily one limited to a certain period." (ENDC/PV.86 p. 51)

This interpretation is supported by the deletion of the words "limited in time" in the Canadian amendment and the word "limited" in the United Kingdom and United States amendment to which I have already referred.

Secondly, the United States and the United Kingdom deemed it necessary, under the pressure of the views expressed during the discussion, to replace the words "effective on-site inspection" by the words "effective detection and identification" (A/C.1/L.316). The General Assembly's wishes on this point are also perfectly clear and provide a positive indication of the direction in which our Conference should continue its work.

Thirdly, the Assembly defined the nature of the international commission referred to in the United Kingdom and the United States amendment by describing it as an "international scientific commission", which corresponds to the wording of the eight-nation memorandum.

(Mr. Parabanov, Bulgaria)

These then are the definitions which the Assembly deliberately omitted from the text of paragraph 6. It is in the light of these wise changes adopted by the General Assembly that the text of paragraph 6 should be interpreted. Any other interpretation would lead us away from the General Assembly's recommendations and make our task much more difficult and less helpful.

In short, paragraph 6, which was originally the work of the three Western Powers, and which they had introduced for the sole purpose of sanctioning the conclusion of a separate agreement on tests in the three environments and on-site inspection in connexion with underground tests, has not produced the effect which those Powers expected. Although insufficiently clear (being the result of an attempt by the Western Powers to oppose the wish clearly expressed in the text of the original proposal, and particularly in paragraph 2 of the resolution) paragraph 6, as amended, leaves no room for the misinterpretation which some Western delegations, probably in consequence of their earlier intentions, wish to give it at the present time. As it stands, this text bears the mark of the deletions which were made under the pressure, and at the wish, of the majority of the General Assembly.

But the very fact that the Western delegations made such efforts to change and if possible to distort the meaning of the draft resolution of the non-aligned countries (A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-4) was a pointer to the way in which the United States and the United Kingdom intended to interpret resolution 1762 A (XVII), and particularly the new paragraph 6.

The changes made in the amendment and in the sub-amendment of the United States and the United Kingdom show the lines which the great majority of the Powers - and of the United Nations - wished the agreements on the discontinuance of nuclear tests to follow. It is on these lines that we should work and that an interim solution can be found, a solution which will enable us to continue negotiations for the conclusion of a final treaty in the absence of nuclear tests in any environment.

Any concession to the intransigence of those who wish to impose their concept of compulsory on-site inspection, or who only want an interim agreement limited in time which would enable underground nuclear tests to be resumed and the nuclear

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

armaments race to be continued, could only aggravate the malady for which the United Nations and the Eighteen-Nation Committee are trying to find a remedy. If an interim solution is insisted on, this must be a solution which will enable the nuclear tests ban to be renewed until a final agreement puts an end to nuclear tests for all time.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I should like to make a brief statement today on the question of a nuclear test ban treaty, the subject now before us.

Before beginning my remarks I would urge all the representatives at this table to read very carefully the verbatim record (ENDC/SC.1/PV.46) of yesterday's meeting of the test ban Sub-Committee. I think they will find it rewarding and interesting. The United States delegation feels that -- despite the most constructive attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom -- the negative attitude adopted by the Soviet Union yesterday is, I am sorry to say, a very unfortunate indication of the possibilities for future progress in our negotiations.

I should like very briefly today to point out how one by one the Soviet Union has been closing the doors leading to possible areas of agreement.

Firstly, I am sure that every representative at this table, with the possible exception of the representatives of the Soviet bloc, is in favour of a comprehensive agreement or treaty ending all nuclear tests, "with effective and prompt international verification", as stated in United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 B (XVII) (ENDC/63 - A/RES/1762(XVII), p.4). Indeed -- again with the exception of the representatives of the Soviet bloc -- every representative here has said so many times. At our plenary meeting on Monday, however, the Soviet representative tried to make it appear otherwise; and he was quickly corrected by the representative of India. (ENDC/PV.86)

In accordance with the desire of everyone to have an agreement ending all testing, the United Kingdom and the United States have prepared a comprehensive test ban draft treaty (ENDC/58) which would accomplish this purpose. That treaty includes the minimum requirements for a control and inspection system based on a thorough scientific study of the requirements for such a system, including obligatory on-site inspection of unidentified events by the international scientific commission which is provided for in article II. As is well known, that draft treaty was one of the proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly and is mentioned in resolution 1762 B (XVII).

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The Soviet Union, on the contrary, without scientific support, has continued to maintain that national systems are sufficient for detection and identification of all tests. However, the proposals of the United Kingdom and the United States for an international control system are based on the experience that those two countries have gained from their own efforts in the field of detecting nuclear tests as well as on an extensive programme of research into the scientific aspects of the detection, location and identification of underground tests, the results of which we have made available to the world.

The Soviet Union has consistently rejected this minimum of necessary control. Thus the first door to agreement has been slammed shut.

Secondly, in view of Soviet opposition to an all-inclusive treaty -- and we ought all of us to be clear about why the United Kingdom and the United States presented the partial ban treaty; it was solely and wholly because of Soviet opposition to an all-inclusive treaty -- our two Governments also proposed a partial ban that would end all tests that cause radioactive fallout which is of great concern to humanity. That partial treaty (ENDC/59) would end all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Our two Governments put forth their proposal for a partial ban in accordance with the express wishes and the express suggestions of various representatives including those of all the eight new nations at this Conference. I might quote, for example, the representative of Brazil, then Foreign Minister de San Thiago Dantas, who stated at our third plenary meeting:

"The technicians of the nations most advanced in nuclear science are, I believe, agreed on the possibility of effective control of tests under water, in the atmosphere and in the biosphere, without more thorough on-site inspections and checks being necessary. We therefore consider that these tests should be suspended immediately. As regards underground tests, studies should be undertaken without delay to determine the minimum degree of on-site inspection that is essential to ensure that the undertakings given are being fulfilled." (ENDC/IV.3, p.9)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

However, again the Soviet response was negative. The Soviet Union stated that it would not accept a partial ban without an uninspected moratorium on underground tests. Thus the Soviet Union clearly bears the moral responsibility for the continuation of testing in environments which cause radioactive fallout. In that way the Soviet Union shut a second door to progress.

Thirdly, at our plenary meetings last week various suggestions were put forth in the attempt to bridge the differences which remain on the question of verification of the cessation of underground testing. The position of the United States on those suggestions is well known and is set forth in its draft treaty, document ENDC/58. The United States is giving careful study to the various suggestions to see if they are consistent with the wording of operative paragraph 6 of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), which provides for "effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission", or resolution 1762 B (XVII) which provides for "the conclusion of a treaty with effective and prompt international verification." While the United States believes that these suggestions merit careful consideration, the Soviet Union, on the other hand, has rejected them in categorical terms. For example, the representative of the Soviet Union stated:

"An objective analysis shows that the considerations concerning so-called interim agreements of the kind mentioned by the representatives of Canada, Mexico and India -- and to some extent this was also referred to by the representative of Sweden -- do not lighten our task. On the contrary, they create new difficulties. They do not help our cause; they complicate it."

(ENDC/FV.86, p. 34)

Thus another possible open door to progress was slammed shut by Soviet intransigence.

The United States has stated on several occasions that Soviet positions in fact have not changed one whit since the Soviet Union's proposal of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11).

The only advance claimed by the Soviet Union is its so-called acceptance of the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28). A person listening to the remarks of Mr. Zorin on 19 April last at a plenary meeting of this Conference and

(Mr. Dean, United States)

at a meeting of its nuclear Sub-Committee might well have believed -- if he just listened -- that the Soviet Union had advanced in its position. For at that time Mr. Zorin, as will be recalled, spoke in terms of abandoning the old Soviet position and accepting the new compromise proposal (ENDC/SC.1/FV.9, p.13). But what in fact is the real Soviet position on the memorandum? Speaking of it Mr. Tsarapkin has stated:

"This was the new approach proposed by the Soviet Union on 28 November 1961.

This new approach has also been recognized as a basis for agreement by all the non-aligned States, and they have stated this in their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28)." (ENDC/SC.1/FV.26, p.21)

Thus it is abundantly clear that the Soviet Union did not really accept the principles of the eight-nation memorandum. The United States, on the other hand, quite honestly stated that although it accepted the eight-nation memorandum as one basis for discussion, and a very important one, it would not accept it as the only basis for discussion.

However, the fact is that the memorandum played an important part in the development of the United States-United Kingdom comprehensive draft treaty proposal (ENDC/58).

I should like also to quote the representative of the Soviet Union on this question of on-site inspections. At our meeting on Monday last he stated:

"On the other hand, there is the desire to impose compulsory inspection on us, when it is known beforehand that this is unacceptable to the Soviet Union. After all, inspection, irrespective of whether or not it is to be carried out under a final agreement or under an interim agreement, still retains characteristics which are objectionable to the other side, since it opens up wide opportunities for collecting information on the defence system of the country which is being inspected." (ENDC/FV.86, p.34)

The authors of the eight-nation memorandum state, on the other hand, that:

"3. They believe that possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis." (ENDC/28)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The position of the Soviet Union that international inspectors from the international commission would be spies for the Western Powers is not only ridiculous, but is an insult to the trustworthy and dedicated international civil servants whom I am sure we all have known in Geneva, New York and elsewhere. Our treaty (ENDC/58) carefully provides, in its article VI for a truly impartial international staff. So we see very clearly that the Soviet Union has not really accepted the principles of the joint memorandum of the eight nations but in fact has remained firmly with its position of 28 November 1961, which remains unchanged. Thus the door to progress and negotiation opened by the efforts of the eight nations also has been closed by the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, every hopeful way towards fruitful discussion and negotiation of outstanding issues has been rather definitely rejected by the Soviet Union. It is the fervent hope of the United States that the Soviet Union will reconsider its position and permit us to explore further at least one of these various areas I have described.

I should now like to turn to another subject of interest. I noted, in reviewing his statement on 3 December 1962, that the representative of Poland attempted to prove that operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) should somehow be paramount above all other portions of that resolution (ENDC/PV.86, p.29). But in that he was merely following the lead already given him by Mr. Tsarapkin in an earlier part of the same meeting (ibid., p.29). I shall want to return in a few minutes to this effort by the Soviet bloc, but there are several other questions connected with the statement by the representative of Poland which I believe deserve some reply.

The crowning piece of evidence which the representative of Poland presents to wind up his rather difficult case on paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 A is based upon the fact that the date for a cessation of tests which figures in that paragraph, that is, 1 January 1963, was presented in this Committee by the representative of Mexico. In this connexion the representative of Poland said:

"Finally, let us not forget that the idea of the cessation of tests by a specific date was born in this very Committee here at this table. It will be recalled that it was the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, who early in our debates made this very suggestion. Its aim and purpose were clear -- to stop all tests unconditionally and to continue negotiations until agreement was reached." (ENDC/PV.36, p. 42)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I note from the record of our meeting on 9 May, when the representative of Mexico first made his proposal (ENDC/PV.34, pp.16 and 17) that the representative of Poland, Mr. Lachs, who is with us today, was not present at that meeting, at least according to the records. But even so, I would have thought that before making such a statement to prove what was obviously a very difficult case before this court, whose high standards for scrutinizing the evidence are well known, the representative of Poland would at least have taken the opportunity to read the evidence which he presents as the final point in making his case. However, it is abundantly clear that he did not read the evidence.

I should like to read just one paragraph from the statement by the representative of Mexico at the meeting on 9 May, as follows:

"In view of this situation, it seems to us that it is becoming increasingly urgent and essential every day to draw up an agreement" -- these are, of course, the representative of Mexico's own words, and not mine, but I underscore the word "agreement" --

"fixing now -- I repeat, now -- the date for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, even if this cannot be before the conclusion of the series of explosions already begun and before the beginning of the answering series announced by the Soviet Union. The plans of both parties for carrying out explosions must have an end, and this end should be fixed now in a treaty," These are again the words of the representative of Mexico -- "in a treaty" --

"because it is dangerous to wait until both series of tests are finished before negotiating an effective agreement that will put a stop to the nuclear arms race." (ibid. p.16)

The Mexican proposal is of course a very far cry from what the representative of Poland said it was. The Mexican proposal was for an effective agreement and not, as the representative of Poland said:

"... to stop all tests unconditionally and to continue negotiations until agreement was reached." (ENDC/PV.36, p.42)

Continuing with a discussion of the General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), which has become a major subject of discussion with us here, it seems to me that the delegations of the Soviet bloc have been seriously intent upon trying to make some

(Mr. Dean, United States)

sort of case to the effect that the entire purpose of the resolution is to provide for an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium to begin on 1 January 1963. In addition to the elaborate arguments advanced by the representative of Poland, to a portion of which I have just referred, the Soviet representative was trying to create this same sort of primacy for paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 A. But the Soviet Union, in its efforts to create some sort of special standing for paragraph 2 of this resolution above and beyond all its other paragraphs, and at the same time to degrade paragraph 6 as not having any importance at all, has actually run foul of itself.

For example, in the verbatim record of our last plenary meeting we find that the Soviet Union supported the overwhelming desire, as it called it, of Member States that paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) be implemented whether there is agreement or not on 1 January 1963. (ibid., p.29) One short paragraph later we find the Soviet representative praising the General Assembly's recommendation on the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28). But somehow or other the Soviet delegation has forgotten that the Assembly's recommendation on the eight-nation memorandum, in the operative part of the resolution at least, falls into paragraph 6, which the Soviet Union seems so anxious to degrade, as well as into paragraphs 4 and 5. Of course, paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) also mentions the other proposals presented during the debate in the General Assembly, including the United Kingdom-United States comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58) which was mentioned in resolution 1762 B (XVII) as well as in 1762 A (XVII). If the question were not so serious, the illogicalities of the Soviet position on resolution 1762 (XVII) would come close to being a farce. What, actually, is the Soviet Union trying to accomplish in its efforts somehow to make out of paragraph 2 the entire sum and substance of resolution 1762 A (XVII) and to down-grade paragraph 6? As I said at yesterday's meeting of the test ban Sub-Committee -- the reading of the verbatim record of which (ENDC/SC.1/PV.46) I again recommend to members of the Committee -- it appears to my delegation that the Soviet delegation does not do these things lightly, or without purpose. My delegation, as soon as it realized what the Soviet Union was doing in this case, saw certain immediate consequences. In the first place, what the Soviet Union is apparently trying to accomplish is to turn resolution 1762 (XVII), which was most carefully drafted and formulated, into an uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests, which the Soviet Union has been trying to get the United States and the United Kingdom to accept for the past year.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Ever since the Soviet Union broke its last unilateral pledge -- made in the person of its highest authority on 14 January 1960 -- it has undoubtedly realized the great value to itself of broken pledges on nuclear testing. For example, Marshal Biryuzov, who, I am informed, is head of the Soviet Army's rocket force, in an article in Red Star on 3 December -- just a few days ago -- boasted that the peace-loving Soviet Union was -- and I quote his words -- "perfecting nuclear warheads which could be delivered to any part of the globe, the largest of them having a yield of 50-60 and more megatons". Just think of it: 60 megatons -- the equivalent of 60 millions tons of TNT. That is quite an accomplishment that the Soviet Union has been able to achieve since it broke its pledge not to test. No wonder the Soviet Union does not want a nuclear test ban treaty. If it keeps on it may be able to develop a warhead with such a megaton yield as would destroy the entire world.

On 14 January 1960 Chairman Khrushchev must have realized, in making his pledge not to renew nuclear explosions while his Western negotiating partners, the United Kingdom and the United States, did not renew their test, that if the Soviet Union continued preparations and at the same time failed to reach agreement it might make some pretty important military breakthrough during future test series as the Soviet Union, indeed, constantly boasts it has done. It appears to me that the Soviet Union is once more heading on such a course, and that is apparently the clue to the statements that are being made in our Committee.

The strong emphasis on paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) -- which, as I have said, the Soviet Union wishes to turn into a General Assembly endorsement of an uninspected moratorium -- leads my delegation to believe that we may once again be greeted with a unilateral pledge on the part of the Soviet Union. Maybe that pledge will again come from the highest authority, just as similar pledges have been given by the leaders of the Soviet Union with regard to a recent situation in the Caribbean with which we are all familiar. In the face of this apparent Soviet tactic of abandoning all pretence at actual negotiations to reach agreement, we can only regret that it has decided it really does not want an agreement after all but is trying to manoeuvre the West in every possible way into some sort of uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium arrangement.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Our position, as we have made clear many times in the past, is very firm on this question: we will sign, and sign promptly -- and promptly implement -- a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests with effective and prompt international verification along the lines of the Western draft treaty (ENDC/58) and in accordance with operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1762 B (XVII); but we cannot, in the light of the unfortunate events of September 1961, accept another uncontrolled, uninspected, unconditional cessation of nuclear tests. Let me repeat: we will sign a treaty banning all nuclear tests; we will not accept an uncontrolled, uninspected moratorium.

We sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will reconsider its tactic of abandoning negotiations in favour of this ill-considered course of once more engaging in unilateral declarations and so-called pledges, or of asking the West to buy -- as the representative of the United Kingdom so aptly put it this morning -- a pig in a poke (supra, p.5). We say, cut the little pig out and let it see the light.

We believe it is fundamental that all disarmament arrangements should be under the necessary strict and effective international control. Soviet abandonment of this principle, while it has been implied in our continuing negotiations for the past six months or so, has never been so completely clear to us as it is now. We came to these negotiations with at least one agreed basis which applied across the board to all of our work towards general and complete disarmament. The joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5) provides in paragraph 6 for the necessary "strict and effective international control" of disarmament measures. To abandon this basis for our continuing negotiations now would be a black augury for our future work.

So we ask that the Soviet Union reconsider this apparent course of irresponsible action and join with us, not in trying to force its position on other States but rather in negotiating a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments, under effective international control, in the same spirit of compromise and willingness to try to see the other side's point of view that we bring to our side of the negotiating table. Perhaps then we could get somewhere.

Mr. MACCUESCU (Romania): The members of our Committee have, by unanimous consent, decided to concentrate their attention on the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. This decision of ours is based, on the one hand, upon the ever more urgent demand of the peoples to stop the nuclear weapon explosions in all environments and for all time and, on the other hand, upon the recent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which, inter alia, asks "that such tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963".

(ENDC/63 - A/RES/1762 (XVII), p.3)

Where do we stand and what are we to do in order to carry out the mandate entrusted to us? After prolonged negotiations the nuclear Powers have reached the conclusion that nuclear weapon tests could cease in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water, the complicated and difficulty-engendering system of on-site inspection having become unnecessary.

As for the underground tests, an understanding has not yet been reached and it is here that the Gordian knot lies. The differences are still significant.

The Western nuclear Powers and their allies suggest that we conclude a partial agreement banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and, as difficulties do exist with regard to the fourth environment, permitting underground tests to be continued.

This proposal is unacceptable not only because it does not provide for a solution of the problem, but also because it does not even bring us nearer to the solution as some people unfortunately believe; quite to the contrary. Of course, if we were to think in accordance with the saying "Better something than nothing", we should accept the idea of a partial agreement, but the wise, when creating their sayings, have never claimed to reflect the entire truth at any time and in all the circumstances. In our particular case, it would not only fail to reflect the truth but it would take us away from it dangerously and people would not call us wise.

What would happen if nuclear weapon tests in the first three environments were banned and underground tests were continued? The process of improving nuclear weapons would go on and thus the danger of a nuclear war would grow. The nuclear arms drive would continue, hence the danger of a nuclear war would grow. Conditions propitious for an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons would be created and thus the peril of nuclear war would grow.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

It may be said that these assertions are groundless, coming as they do from one who is not an expert in the relevant field, and one who is the representative of a socialist State -- a fact which some infer means that we are interested in rejecting ab initio any proposal coming from the other side. The truth is that the basic ideas behind these suggestions are not mine. In compliance with the obligations regarding the disclosure of copyright and recognition due to the author, I feel obliged to quote from what Mr. Paul M. Nitze, the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, has said. On 17 September 1962 -- that is, two and a half months ago during our recess -- on the eve of the opening of the session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Nitze, speaking before the Preparedness Investigating Sub-Committee of the Committee on Armed Services, declared:

"With a test ban treaty of a non-comprehensive nature, in which testing underground were permitted, many weapons design improvements of importance could still be carried out; there would remain some important uncertainties -- probably on both sides -- with respect to weapons effects. In essence, nuclear weapons development would continue ..."

I am convinced that the Chairman has noticed that in my statement I did nothing but repeat what the Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States had said. I confess that the last part -- that is, the conclusion that in such conditions the danger of a nuclear war would grow -- is my own. Mr. Nitze did not say that, but I believe the conclusion is not mine alone; it belongs to all peoples of good will here in this Conference room and extra muros, wherever they may be.

This being so, the suggested formula for a partial cessation of thermonuclear weapon tests is not satisfactory. It is imperative that we find the solution necessary for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. That means that we must remove the difficulties which prevent our reaching agreement on underground testing. What is the main and, apparently, the only difficulty? The stand taken by the Western Powers on the question of inspection. The Western nuclear Powers and their allies plead that there is no guarantee for the discontinuance of underground tests unless international obligatory on-site inspection is accepted. In the draft treaty submitted to this Committee on 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58) by the delegations of the United States and of the United Kingdom, this condition is clearly laid down.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

To us, this condition appears to be unjustified and here is our explanation why we consider this to be so: it has been stated repeatedly in this Committee and outside it that the existing technical means, which are being improved speedily and continuously, cover the practical needs with regard to the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. The Western nuclear Powers and their allies have rejected this argument, voiced not only by the socialist delegations but also by the other side; and not only by politicians but also by scientists. In their insistence on the obligatory nature of international on-site inspection, the Western nuclear Powers and their allies state that in this way alone could they have a complete guarantee that no underground tests have been carried out. This claim is groundless.

If I am not mistaken, no one in this Committee has ever submitted that an environment exists in which there could be one hundred per cent detection and identification of nuclear explosions. It is obvious that the underground environment constitutes no exception in this respect. Hence, a former member of the United States delegation, Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which has numerous representatives in the present United States delegation, felt justified in stating on 18 September 1962 before the same Preparedness Investigating Sub-Committee of the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate:

"There is always the possibility of a threshold under which detection would be difficult, certainly on any isolated single test. One must always have in mind that it is unlikely that any single test will make any substantial difference in the strategic balance. It is also unlikely that any series of tests will fail of detection with modern methods which, we believe, are dependable."

May I presume to dwell upon two aspects of outstanding significance contained in Mr. Foster's statement. First, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency admits the possibility of certain underground nuclear tests, taken separately, remaining undetected. But, given the responsibility and competence implied by the office he holds, Mr. Foster reaches the conclusion that "it is unlikely that any single test will make any substantial difference in the strategic balance". Secondly, from what Mr. Foster said, it follows that only a series of nuclear weapon tests is of real interest for us from the point of view of the problem with which we are concerned, or -- and here lies the essence of the matter -- that a series of underground nuclear tests cannot fail to be discovered.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

In that case, what is the source of the categorical claim by the Western nuclear Powers to take extra safety measures, by any means and at any price? A 100 per cent coefficient of safety does not exist in any field. Legal restrictions on a national and international scale have never proceeded and cannot proceed from the premise that in every specific case reality can be covered 100 per cent. Murder has been banned under the legislation of all countries, though nobody can deny that cases may occur when a murder remains undiscovered and the murderer goes unpunished. What could be said about a legislature which, because of the impossibility of discovering 100 per cent of all the cases of murder, refused on those grounds to ban murder?

It has been repeatedly stated in this Committee that, in the present circumstances, when a treaty on general and complete disarmament has not been concluded and, consequently, the process of general and complete disarmament by stages has not begun, international on-site inspection with regard to the discontinuance of underground tests may create danger for the security of one of the parties, may create tense moments in an international situation which is already tense.

But it is not only this aspect of the matter, making obligatory on-site inspection unacceptable, upon which I want to dwell now, though it is of paramount importance; I would call attention to another.

Let us assume that under the agreement on the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests provision is made for obligatory on-site inspection. Suppose that, during the implementation of the agreement, one of the parties refuses such an inspection. In that case, the other party, relying on the principle of inadimplenti non est adimplendum -- that is, that if a signatory does not fulfil its obligations the other signatory is, in its turn, free from its obligations -- will certainly find it proper not to respect its obligations any longer. Consequently it will resume its underground tests. By attaching such conditions of super-safety to an agreement which is meant to bring us together for the fulfilment of a great historical task, we run the risk of turning it into an instrument of disagreement, a source of disunion and of conflict. I think that we should weigh on a very fine and objective balance the advantages and disadvantages of certain proposals and courageously draw the necessary conclusions. On-site inspection does not render service to any who are really concerned with complete and final cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Does it appear that we have got into a blind alley, with no way out, with no possibility of mutual understanding? It is the conviction of the Romanian delegation that, objectively speaking, all the necessary conditions do exist for the conclusion of an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests, without any exception and for ever. For this purpose it is both necessary and sufficient that the Western Powers should give up their unjustified claim with respect to obligatory international on-site inspections. A situation could thus be ensured in which no nuclear weapon tests would take place after 1 January 1963.

In order to fulfil the task incumbent upon our Committee, it is necessary to start from a common platform, from a common basis of negotiations. We do have such a basis and I should like to insist now on the necessity to safeguard this basis, this common asset, all the more valuable as, notwithstanding the undoubted narrowing of the gap between the respective positions, there are still differences which prevent agreement being reached. This basis for negotiations is the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) submitted on 16 April 1962. As is known, the Soviet and other socialist delegations had already, on 19 April, accepted that memorandum as a basis for negotiations. To our mind its principal merit consists in its spirit of compromise.

The significance of that document has become even greater after its endorsement by the United Nations General Assembly. In resolution 1762 A (XVII), the General Assembly,

"Considering that the memorandum represents a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests," proclaims, in paragraph 4, that it

"Endorses the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 as a basis for negotiation." (ENDC/63, - A/RES/1762 (XVII), pp. 2 and 3)

As has been stressed by other delegations, this basis for negotiations alone has received the endorsement of the General Assembly.

The time is ripe for earnest negotiations in the spirit of compromise represented by the eight-nation memorandum in order to reach agreement. I cannot refrain from noting that during the last week there have appeared certain tendencies

(Mr. Iacovescu, Romania)

to depart from the spirit and the letter of that document, a document which the Romanian delegation has accepted, as submitted, as a compromise formula. The Romanian delegation considers that proposals like those referring to the obligatory character of international control, and others, are apt to alter the very content of the memorandum.

I should like to make myself clear. The Romanian delegation is ready to support such proposals as tend to further the spirit of the eight-nation memorandum, proposals which facilitate finding a solution on that basis.

We are studying attentively the proposal of the delegation of Sweden submitted on 28 November 1962 (ENDC/PV.84, pp. 17 et seq.); and if we reach the conclusion that it contains elements which will help us to fulfil our task we shall gladly support them.

One hundred and twenty-five years ago, Lamartine, the French poet -- beholding the blue-green waters of Lac du Bourget -- exclaimed:

"O temps suspends ton vol!

Et vous, heures propices, suspendez votre cours!"

Here on the shores of the Lake of Geneva we could address the same invocation to time. But time will not heed us, as it did not heed Lamartine. It flows unceasingly and is pressing on relentlessly. Nevertheless let us face it bravely.

Should we now be unable to sign a comprehensive agreement, there is still another possibility -- that of immediately concluding an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, whilst continuing the negotiations for the banning of these tests in the underground environment, too. The agreement in question should contain the mutual obligation not to carry out underground nuclear tests over the whole duration of the negotiations and up until the coming into force of an agreement banning those tests too.

Do we thus come closer to cutting the Gordian knot? The delegation of Romania expresses both its hope and its conviction that we do.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (Translation from French): If there are no objections, I propose to adjourn the meeting, and at its next meeting the Committee will be able to hear the statements of the representatives of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Nigeria. I give the floor to the representative of Poland on a point of order.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): With the agreement of the Committee I should like to speak on a point of order. I shall be brief in view of the lateness of the hour.

I wish to refer to what the representative of the United States said on the subject of the statement which I made on Monday, 3 December, 1962 (ENDC/PV.86, pp.41 et) s. I felt very honoured, as indeed I always do when the representative of the United States refers to my modest contribution to this debate.

I was particularly honoured when he said that he had noted my absence at one of these meetings at which the representative of Mexico made his statement. Although he noticed my absence, I most respectfully submit that he could not have known whether or not I read the statements made at that meeting.

To come to the point at issue, I wish to refresh the memories of representatives here by again quoting what the representative of Mexico said on 9 May 1962. I apologize for having made his speech a case at issue, and I trust that he will bear with me. At that meeting the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, said:

"But although the nuclear powers have persisted in ignoring the vehement demand of all the peoples, deceiving themselves with the mirage or lure of a lasting military advantage, we must all endeavour to help them fix an agreed date now, before the end of the series of tests by the two parties, so that this year or the beginning of next year may see a definite end to the senseless nuclear competition." (ENDC/PV.34, p.17)

However, the story does not end there because it has further chapters which were written both in this Committee and at the United Nations General Assembly. I think that the representative of the United States read the record of the plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly held on 15 October 1962, at which the representative of Mexico again spoke and, on this very subject, suggested that the General Assembly should resolve:

"(1) To urge the nuclear Powers to suspend all nuclear and thermonuclear tests underground, in the sea, in the atmosphere or in outer space as soon as possible and, at the latest, by 1 January 1963,".

I now come to the most important paragraph:

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

"(2) To urge the nuclear Powers urgently to continue negotiations tending to achieve the conclusion of binding agreements banning such nuclear and thermonuclear explosions for ever.

"The cessation of nuclear tests on 1 January at the latest," -- and this is a point I should like to emphasize -- "a date we suggested in Geneva, would have a very healthy effect on the world atmosphere and would help to settle many other collateral questions which appear on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee." (A/PV.1153 (provisional), pp.98-101)

I think this makes it clear that the date had to be fixed and that negotiations had to continue. That is the authentic interpretation of the remarks of the representative of Mexico. Although the representative of the United States may disagree with me, certain facts are undeniable, and I think I have cited them as they were.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I think that the record speaks for itself.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I have gladly given up my idea of speaking today, but I should like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, if you consider that the Polish representative's remarks really referred to a point of order concerning our work today.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-seventh plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Assumpcao de Araujo, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Bulgaria, the United States, Romania and Poland.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 7 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.